With this paper we approach the new policy making paradigm for Europe's higher education policy, set with the Bologna Process, given emphasis to the legitimacy deficit of this political venture and the necessity of a crisis management over the implementation phase within national frames. The implementation of the Bologna's policies, using Greece as a case study, reveals a crisis management reality, originating from an understanding of the Bologna Process as a top dawn initiative by the academic community, and so on society, while also the legitimization basis of this venture is considered flimsy and the role of the European leveled interest groups in question. The conditions of the Bologna's implementation and the crisis management outcome reflect the type of Europeanization occurring on the field of higher education in the Greek case and possibly in other national frames.
Introduction
Over the last decade in Europe the Bologna Process and the objective for creating a European Higher Education Area brought serious changes in this public policy. These changes were not only related to a new European level policy making paradigm with the creation of a policy network and the participation of a vast number of interest groups, but to the actual field of higher education as the systems and institutional practices of 47 European countries were placed under reform. Bologna's process impact, giving emphasis to the implementation phase of the proposed reforms, created the conditions for an Europeanization interpretation. At the same time, the implementation phase of Bologna's policies made obvious a crisis management reality which seems to be stemming from the legitimacy questions raised on this political venture. Following, we are to examine Bologna Process as a new policy making paradigm and to approach the legitimization basis of this policy network initiative while exploring the links between Bologna's policies, the subsequent crisis management, and the outcome of the implementation phase in terms of Europeanization, evidenced in the Greek case.
a new mode of governance based on policy networks but without being a European Union's policy, even though the outcomes of the Bologna Process are supported by the EU. The characteristics of the Bologna Process as a political venture and more specifically as a policy network are crucial for an understanding of the interpretation of this political initiative in terms of legitimacy deficit arousing a crisis management reality for the implementation of its outcomes.
Taking into consideration Rhodes and Marsh typology on policy networks, between policy community and issue networks, they give emphasis on four dimensions which are membership, integration, resources, and power. Even though Dowding replaces the emphasis on actors or broader on interest groups politics by stating that "…the nature of the policy process and the network of interests from which it emerges can be explained without recourse to the language of networks. The language… is that of bargaining strategies, power resources and coalition possibilities. Policies emerge through power struggles of different interests. (Dowding 1995, p 145 )" (Hudson & Lowe 2006, p. 136 ) (Note 1) it is useful for us to explore Bologna Process characteristics in this perspective as it helps us explore the questions of legitimacy raised (Table 1) .
Relative to Rhodes& Marsh note "inevitably, no policy area will conform exactly to either list of characteristics; hence the need to retain the term 'policy networks' as a generic description. It is equally important to focus on trends in a given policy area: to explore the extent to which it is becoming more or less integrated or an interest is becoming more or less dominant" (Rhodes & Marsh 1992, p.187) . Acknowledging the issue network as a more loose policy network, we are to consider Bologna Process as resembling more to policy community in grounds of its regulating dynamic as evidenced by the intensity of the reforming outcomes in this policy field as interpreted to an Europeanization effect.
Exploring the Bologna Process as to the first dimension noticed, we see that the process has based its membership choice on the "European Cultural Convention", meaning that the participating countries in the Bologna Process are not only the EU's member states, but potentially all the 'European' countries of the 1955 treaty (Note 2). This choice in membership creates a vast number of participants which till now reached to 47 countries as mentioned earlier. So even though it seems that the Bologna Process in terms of participation resembles more to an issue network there is a big question raised based on the differentiation of influence over the agenda setting of the process thus an even greater question on the underling hierarchy of leaders within the process. Meaning that if we are to explore the membership in terms of power a question is raised whether one group dominates within the process even though the outcomes of the Bologna Process are based on the prerequisite of a positive sum game and even though all of the participants are considered to have recourses.
These questions are mostly based on the EU membership and the role of the European Commission over the Bologna Process agenda setting. When approaching the Bologna Process the procedures endorsed, the monitoring of the process, and the active participation of the European Commission makes it difficult to distinguish why this is not a European Union's initiative. Evidentially to that it had to be clarified in Bologna's documentation that the Commission is not running the Process and that the process is an inter-governmental venture (Note 3). Moreover, the fact that the Bologna Process seemed to continue more or less the policy outline set on the Sorbonne Declaration in 1998 which aimed in the 'harmonization of the European Higher Education Systems' signed by France, United Kingdom, Germany and Italy, combined with a partial acknowledgement of this date as the first informal meeting of the Bologna Process, the view of hierarchy seems to be even more enhanced.
In addition apart from the participating countries in the Bologna Process we see that a vast number of interest groups are involved. As Tomusk (2007) comments the "Bologna Process,..., seems to be much about each interest group trying to get its own message to be added to any of the official declarations or communiqués" (p.4). The interesting thing about the participating stakeholders is that their interest is mostly linked with one key guiding policy agenda and by that the most crucial objectives set within the Bologna Process in terms of interest diversification are pointed out.
In particular, for the recognition and qualification frames we see that it is of interest to the Council of Europe, to the ENIC-NARIC networks which are the representative body of the national agencies responsible for the recognition of degrees, the UNESCO/CEPES, which is the correspondent department for educational and higher education policies. Also the EURASHE, which is the union for post-secondary institutes, gives emphasis to this field, while also to the agenda for the degree cycles. Moreover, BussinessEurope the employer's interest group and OECD, even though the last one is not a participant in the Bologna Process, seem to be interested in this agenda as they express their interest also in the interrelation of ERA with EHEA and generally to the objectives set for the economic development. Regarding the agenda for quality assurance we see that the EUA (European Universities Association) is actively involved to that, as ENQA, which is the European organization for quality assurance. Moreover, we notice that the social dimension of the Bologna Process is mostly of interest to the ESU (European Students Union or previously known as ESIB) as it is also interested in the agendas for the new learning paradigm shift, as is the IE (International Education) which is the voice of the academics.
The underling distrust to the legitimization of the Bologna Process regarding the interest group participation is based on the fact that this European leveled representation in particular of the social stakeholders actually formed over the last decade. Additionally, the development of some interest groups-both organizational and subject related-occurred during the bologna process and one can notice in accordance to the Bologna's agendas. Additionally, some interest groups for example that of ESU and IE were later on attributed a role in the Bologna Process even though these two stakeholders are crucial as they are to represent the academic community at a European level meaning students and academics. Their participation on the Bologna Process as well as their legitimacy basis within their own structure is of great importance to the total acknowledgement that this initiative actually involves interest representation from national frames and not merle pretence for legitimizing the policy outcomes.
Nevertheless, Bologna Process contributed in opening the political opportunity structure (in Charles Tilly's terms) and strengthened consultation on Higher Education issues. In the following chart we can notice the expansion of interest based organizations in European Higher Education and Research from 1970 to 2005 (Beerkens, 2008) pointing out that after the 90's there was a significant expansion to their number considering it relevant to the Bologna Process activities. (Figure 1 .) So, even though this vast participation of countries and interest groups extended the policy makers at a European level at the same time questions were raised in terms of leadership over the agenda setting creating furthermore a belief that there are "hidden agendas", while also over the legitimacy of the newly established European leveled interest groups.
Bologna Process in terms of integration meets all the prerequisites of a policy community as there are frequent high quality interactions of all groups on all matters related to the policy issues. The Bologna Process includes, apart from the communiqués set every two years, the Bologna Follow Up Group in which there are representatives from all participating members working on the objectives set and monitoring the progress of the process. At start, in terms of governmental procedures ensuring this high quality interaction, the process used what is called a rolling agenda process while after the Lisbon Strategy endorsed what is known the "open method of coordination" a newly at the time established mode of governance which is based on a soft law approach set in participation and active interaction. In practice, the open method of coordination as a governmental procedure ensures continuity in terms of common membership values and outcomes persistence over time and consensus meaning that all of the participants share the basic values and accept the legitimacy of the outcome.
As Rhodes & Marsh "suggests…By implication, policy communities are either dominated by the Government or they serve the interests of all the members of the community, given that over time they develop common interests" (Rhodes & Marsh 1992, p. 184) . The legitimacy of the outcome is the actual engagement to reform their higher education systems and institutional practices in order to meet the commonly accepted objectives for the EHEA. This vast participation of countries in the Bologna Process creates an Europeanization phenomenon and not just as a EU-ization effect, as it involves more countries than the EU member-states, evidenced on the outcomes of this political venture expressed within national frames in reforming acts.
As Radaelli (2003) points, when approaching the outcomes of Europeanization, there are four possible states: retrenchment, inertia, absorption, and transformation. The retrenchment shows a negative outcome moving away that is from the proposed reforms as for inertia is the condition of no change. Absorption as Radaelli (2003) put it "indicates change as adoption. Domestic structures and policy legacy provide a mixture of resilience and flexibility. They can absorb certain non-fundamental changes but maintain their core. Absorption as specified by Héritier (2001) is accommodation of policy requirements without real modification" (Radaelli 2003, p.37) . The Bologna Process outcomes, so far, can be viewed as the road from the state of absorption to the state of transformation. The in between of those two state's outcomes on Europeanization are related to several factors; one of them can be considered the legitimacy deficit acknowledged especially for countries that have to reform their systems and institutional practice in depth. Under this scope, one can examine further on the following findings marked in the Trend 2010 documentation for institutional realization of the EHEA (Figure 2 ).
The most recent declaration for the creation of the European Higher Education Area gives emphasis to this reality of miss-implementation at national and institutional levels by noting "recent protests in some countries partly directed against developments and measures not related to the Bologna Process, have reminded us that some of the Bologna aims and reforms have not been properly implemented and explained. We acknowledge and will listen to the critical voices raised among staff and students. We note that adjustments and further work, involving staff and students, are necessary at European, national and especially institutional levels to achieve the European Higher Education Area as we envisage it". Moreover, it was also noted that "at national level we also strive to import communication on the understanding of the Bologna Process among all stakeholders and society as a whole" (Budapest-Vienna Declaration, 2010, p. 1-2).
This statement partially reveals an understanding of a legitimacy deficit or otherwise that this is a top dawn policy venture when acknowledging that there is a need for further engagement of national stakeholders to address the protests noted. These protests are mostly seen as an outcome of false Bologna reforms implemented under its label. Nevertheless, the Bologna Process acknowledges a crisis management over the implementation face giving directions, so it seems, to national governments in order to engage further on communication as the basic tactic for dealing with the implementation crisis. So, national stakeholders and societies must be better informed on the Bologna's policies for the implementation within national and institutional frames to become as envisioned and further on for the Europeanization's outcomes to involve into the state of transformation. But, is this the case?
Implementation and Crisis Management: The Greek Case
The implementation phase of the Bologna Process within the "Greek case" is approached through a crisis management perspective highlighted in the most major reforming acts occurring over the last decade. Crisis management has been a necessity for the Greek governments implementing the Bologna agendas since the beginning and it is not a resent phenomenon. The conditions for such a necessity lay in two major factors. The first one in the societal disbelief about the positive outcomes of a process considered to be determined mostly by others or other interests and secondly as a legitimacy deficit of a process that is inadequate in dealing with the lack of national societal stakeholders' participation as the case of academics and students (Note 4). The aspect raised by Bologna's last communiqué that within the Bologna label there are introduced national oriented reforms even though to some extend true it is not considered a crucial factor for a crisis management over the Bologna Process at least in the Greek case. That is because a crisis management necessity already existed to the actual Bologna reforms.
Relative to the first point in the Greek case, when the academics were asked how they perceive Greece's co-decisive ability to the Bologna Process agendas, this view of hierarch over the agenda setting was verified as mostly they don't believe that Greece has a saying over the agenda setting (Figure 3. ).
Moreover the second factor noted is of great importance as the contribution of academics and students and their reactions create the need for a crisis management over the implementation within national and mostly within institutional levels. The success of the crisis management, by intensifying the communication over Bologna's agendas in the form of a public discourse (Note 5), determines the actual implementation and further on the type of Europeanization occurring. In the Greek case this type of crisis management is obvious to every Bologna reform.
Since the beginning of the Bologna Process in Greece there have been four major reforms mainly for: the degree cycles, quality assurance that included ECTS and DS provision, a managerial reform to higher education institutes introducing the social agenda of the Bologna Process and a fourth reform related to the recognition agenda.
The first Bologna reform was introduced in 2001 related to the cycle degree agenda and was concerned mainly with a structural reform of the Greek higher education system (Law 2916/01). The Greek higher education was divided into two categories of higher education institutes, the so called AEI (Universities) and TEI (the Technological Educational Institutes). This previous division between them existed since 1981 categorizing the institutions in a hierarchical order. The AEI was considered to be more advanced because their graduates were fully acknowledged of their professional competencies having the opportunity to continue their studies, while the graduates of the second category of TEI professional skills were ambiguous and they couldn't continue in other degree cycles, at least within the Greek higher education system. This first Bologna driven reform caused a serious reaction within the academic community in terms of strikes and protesting (Note 6). On the one hand students of AEI's protested as they believed that such an upgrade to TEI's status would be injustice as it would threat their working status of professional rights in the job marked. On the other hand, university academics posed serious reactions, and some of them made a coalition claiming that such a reform was against the constitution. Their main argument stated that there is a major gap between the educational standards of the AEI and the ones existing on TEI's. Relatively to that they argued that university academics face serious prerequisites in order to be qualified as teachers rather than the educational staff of TEI's which some of them were confirmed as teachers only by having work experience and not by having a PhD degree. The ministry of education crisis management was based on an extensive public discourse pointing the need for comparability while also making a case for correcting an injustice over the study paths of TEI's graduates.
The interesting thing about this reform is that even today, when the academics are asked if they agreed with the www.ccsenet.org/ies International Education Studies Vol. 5, No. 3; June 2012 ISSN 1913 -9020 E-ISSN 1913 90 upgrade of TEI's status, the majority expresses their full disagreement. Nevertheless, when asked about the actual outcomes of this specific reform and the impact it had over the higher education Greek system, the majority answers that it didn't have such a big impact over it (Note 7) (Figure 4 ).
So the actual effects acknowledged do not sum up to a total transformation of the Greek Higher Education system even though nowadays universities and technological institutes are considered distinct but equal (Note 8). Students of both sectors have the opportunity to continue their studies on other degree cycles, something that is shown in trend 2010 report as an achievement (p. 35), but the professional right of TEI's graduates where not redefined (Note 9).
The second most important Bologna reform in the Greek case was the implementation of a quality assurance mechanism, as the ECTS and the Diploma Supplement agendas (Law 3374/05). This reform is the most evidential implementation of the Bologna Process. Even though one can think that this reforming act was welcomed due to the previous lack of any quality assurance procedure, actually there was a big resistance towards this also. The concern was about the standards and the quality assurance model to be actually implemented. The model of ranking or otherwise expressed the "fear" of ranking, created a serious dislike on the total process of implementing a quality assurance mechanism. The argument was that higher education quality of teaching can not be measured and thus the evaluation will be placed on outcomes based mostly on financial terms and will create even more a market oriented philosophy, causing a serious damage on the humanitarian and social studies which lack in market competition.
The mechanism was reinforced with some delay from the beginning of the discourse due to the extensive reactions caused by the academics. Finally, a model was introduced that set the actual structural conditions of the Bologna Process in practice without any provision for ranking. The academics nowadays accept the necessity for quality assurance procedures but they are reluctant to believe in the beneficial impact of the Hellenic Quality Assurance Organization's work. (Figure 5) This negative prediction mostly emphasizes the belief that the reforms actually do not change the underling reality of the higher education system, even though as noted in the trend 2010 report in 5years time from now the most important changes are to occur in the field of quality assurance (Note 10).
The third reforming act (Law 3549/2007), which in the national report of 2009 was included under the Bolognas reforms, is the most disputed whether it should be linked with the Bologna Process as it mixes the guidelines of the Bologna Process with some reforms deriving as a necessity from the characteristics of the Greek higher education system. This reform was mainly about the management of higher education institutes (Note 11). The most important managerial measures taken are: the introduction of a four year development plan based on the strategies of the institutions, the introduction of a manager called "HEI's Secretary" but not what is otherwise referred to as a "Bologna Manager" while also changed the election system of chancellors and heads of departments.
This reform made the conditions for expanding student participation by giving universal suffrage for all of the students and not only for their representatives from the student unions which determines 40% of the outcome. Till now students were contributing in the election of chancellors and heads of departments by their representatives coming from competitive student unions similar to the Greek parties. This change was made in order to address specific Greek higher education management issues that were actually not at all addressed leaving the basic core of this reform untamed (Note 12). Also a top duration for studies was introduced, a measure that before being finalized created much reaction from the students. This time frame was introduced for administrative reasons -again not a Bologna measure even though it was combined with a measure presented to increase flexibility on study paths as it gave the opportunity to students to pause their studies in order to get work experience, travel etc.
The agendas in this reform coming in direct relation to the Bologna process were about social provisions regarding that scholarships and interest-free loans while also for improving students support services but all these measures actually didn't contributed much to the practices predated them. This reform aimed in redefining several institutional management aspects but it was not considered to be that effective or going in much depth to address the Greek higher education problems evidentially (figure 6).
Along side a big societal disagreement was expressed in the 2006 constitutional revision as there was the intention to change the conditions for higher education to be provided not only by the state but from the private sector as well (Note 13). The Greek landscape for private higher education is complicated. Even though there are no officially recognized private universities, there are a lot of franchised private universities while also other types of institutions at a postsecondary level with rather ambiguous legitimacy. The fact that the constitutional change was abandoned due to the vast student's and social reactions posing issues of professional qualifications deregulation from the recognition of institutions considered some of them operating in less academicals standards created a crisis management the outcome of which can be considered the law for regulating and accrediting post secondary institutes (Law 3696/2008 ).
This law actually officially recognized the franchises of foreign higher education institutes when acknowledged as such by their originating systems and as for the other types of institutes they set prerequisites for accreditation. Again in this law, changes where made that even though they provided a regulation on their operational status, the underling reality was not differentiated. The upcoming reform for the national qualification framework related also to the VET qualification and life long learning is considered crucial and is expected also to raise serious reactions.
One could assume that the reactions caused by the academic community are because the operational status of Greece's higher education was considered effective. This however is not the case as when the academics were asked about their satisfaction over Greece's higher education system, they believe that the operational status of the Greek HEI's can be considered quite substandard. This climate of critical thinking over the role and the function of the university could have been a perfect condition for a policy paradigm shift but still Bologna Process agendas do not gather a vote of confidence by the academic community. The academics (when asked to what extend they believe that the Bologna Process initiative and the subsequent reforms are to create positive outcomes) were rather hesitant to support the Bologna Process beneficial effects (Figure 7) .
Nevertheless, the degree of information of academics over the Bologna Process is a crucial factor and as we can see in the following chart there is still quite a big part of the academic world not adequately informed (Figure 8 ).
The interesting thing is that there seems to be a positive correlation between the level of information and the positive evaluation of the Bologna Process (Note 14). This correlation can be considered as an outcome of the crisis management for implementing the Bologna Process; meaning that over time the objectives set by the Bologna Process for the EHEA are gaining ground when the academics are involved and better informed about them. So it seems that the future of the European Higher Education Area as envisioned is linked with a crisis management aspect in terms of reinforcing the legitimacy basis with greater involvement of national and institutional stakeholders.
Concluding Remarks
Higher education institutes, and in general the academic community, are set in the center of this policy paradigm shift as they are to endorse the proposed policies and reshape the role of the university. Bologna Process as a new policy making paradigm set in a policy network mode, even introducing new modes of governance is understood as a top down political venture as pointed in the Greek case and being a belief for others in the European community. Nevertheless, the fact that the academic community tend to agree with the beneficial outcomes of the Bologna Process when informed about its context seems to create the need for the Bologna's Process agendas crisis management in terms of being communicated in a more extensive manner for the objectives and goals underpinning this initiative to be accepted and believed that they actually are to create better conditions for the future of the European Higher Education. So the guidelines for the crisis management are set on the need for greater involvement of stakeholders at national and institutional levels, on communication and good practices dissemination for the Europeanization outcomes to reach in the state of transformation moving forward from the state of absorption.
Would that be enough for reaching the objectives of the envisioned European Higher Education Area? Taken into consideration that new conditions emerge from the global recession and from Europe's present economic and political transient stage the European Higher Education Area has to be prepared to address not only the existing problems but also the new societal needs and conditions. The social dimension of the EHEA, not only as a brand characteristic but as an agenda that has to address the actual problems, one can assume that it will be placed in the forefront of societal demands for higher education in the next decade. The most certain thing is that within these rapidly changing conditions the policies of the European Higher Education Area in the following years will determine its actual impact in Europe's higher education and of course the viability of this venture as envisioned. 
